Of Machines Learning to See Lemon by Fass, John & McClymont, Alistair





In the seventeenth-century heyday of Dutch still life painting, exemplified by painters such as Jan 
Davids de Heem and Pieter Claesz  lemons feature heavily as opportunities for the display of 
matchless technique. They also fulfilled many complex symbolic functions. For the newly enriched 
bourgeoisie of the Dutch Golden Age, still life paintings were subtle displays of ownership and 
wealth derived from the Dutch colonies in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Taiwan and the trade in 
commodities extracted from these territories to Europe. This trade was facilitated by the state-
supported monopoly of the Dutch East India Company, an early example of a consolidated global 
corporation. Over its two-hundred-year history, the Dutch East India Company transformed from a 
trading company into a transglobal body with many of the characteristics of an independent state. 
It was able to implement its strategies through force of arms, the establishment of multiple 
independent markets from Amsterdam to Jakarta, and the determined exploitation of conquered 
lands and peoples. 

Still life paintings are a product of this sociopolitical system, which accrued unprecedented levels 
of wealth for those with access to the opportunities provided by the company, as Toby Sonneman 
has pointed out in her history of the lemon. The visual work performed by fruit in these images 
reminds the viewer that the owner can aﬀord to purchase and consume fruit imported from far 
away (and, of course, that they have suﬃcient spare income to engage an artist to mediate this 
message). Lemons, like all fruit in still life paintings, conjure impressions of decay and the 
transient nature of human life, but they also have a particular place in communicating acidity or 
bitterness, as well as the interior-exterior dynamic of hidden power exerting its influence seen in 
the contrast between the rough outer skin of a lemon and its glistening lustrous interior. Art 
historian Julie Berger Hochstrasser has emphasised the importance of pictures of lemons as 
especially extravagant ways of displaying aﬄuence—“the ostentation of a whole lemon peeled 
and sitting at the ready, just for a little squeeze of juice” (Hochstrasser, 200). 

Lemons were by no means unknown in Northern Europe, having been brought back from the 
Middle East by Crusaders in the eleventh century, and were certainly known in antiquity as 
recorded by Theophrastus’ Historia Plantarum of 300BC. Nevertheless, in the seventeenth century, 
only those with the financial means to purchase and consume them would know what they were 
and what they tasted like. Recognising a lemon by its shape, texture, and colour—for what it was 
and for its cultural and symbolic significance—was only possible for those who could see real 
lemons in the marketplace or identify them in visual representations.
In contrast to the social reading of how physical objects are recognised, in neuroscience and 
computer science object recognition in the human visual system is considered to be a function of 
complex brain processes that depend on a cascade of reflexive operations. Di Carlo observes, “we 
effortlessly detect and classify objects from among tens of thousands of possibilities 7 and we do 
so within a fraction of a second 6 despite the tremendous variation in appearance that each object 
produces on our eyes.”  The complexity of these neural operations are evident in the fact that “All 1
visual cortical areas share a six-layered structure and the inputs and outputs to each visual area 
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share characteristic patterns of connectivity” (DiCarlo et al. 2012) 1.  The task of producing a 2
representation of sufficiently high fidelity to visually identify objects is poorly understood, and there 
is considerable debate about how it takes place in the brain. Computer scientists have 
concentrated on constructing computational models of perception, in order to produce explanations 
along the lines of a Turing machine, i.e. mathematical models that can simulate an infinite number 
of states. Neuroscientists, in contrast, have focused on the spatial distribution of the relevant brain 
activity and how these areas may be connected to each other, in other words operating at the 
cellular and molecular level of cortical circuitry. 
A computer vision system recognises a lemon in a very different way, although it is rooted in the 
search for the neural ‘algorithm’ of human visual object recognition. Computational object 
recognition requires ‘training’ using relevant data. The ability of a computer to correctly identify a 
lemon depends on the number, quality, and accuracy of examples in the data class lemon the 
system has been exposed to. In addition, the human visual system is very good at processing 
interruptions to the visual field (we have no difficulty in, say, recognising a tennis racket that is 
resting on a chair in front of a window that looks onto a river). In the scenario above a computer 
would need to identify every object, perceive how they are arranged in space, assign the correct 
label to each one, and recognise the whole as a scene. As van Gool points out, “The same object 
will look different depending on the viewpoint, the illumination, or the occlusions caused by other 
objects in front.”  Furthermore, the wide variation between instances of the same object means 3
that the “recognition of an object as belonging to a particular group is a harder problem for a 
computer than the recognition of a specific object.”  One lemon does not look exactly like another, 4
and therefore significant computational resources must be devoted to distinguish between different 
views, types, or examples of lemons as an object class. As a result, much attention is given to pre-
categorisation of images of objects via tagging or other taxonomic labelling methods. This requires 
large amounts of individual images, but perhaps more significantly a dominant logic of 
categorisation, to work. 
As more and more detailed models are developed based on the millions of images used as training 
data for object recognition learning algorithms, so system complexity increases. Torralba says, 
“Deep learning works very well, but it’s very hard to understand why it works—what is the internal 
representation that the network is building.”  The outcome is an opaque system, resistant to 5
analysis, impervious to scrutiny. Often the data scientists behind this work have no idea why they 
obtain certain results, and have to commit resources to reverse-engineering them in order to gain a 
deeper understanding.  This opacity of computational recognition systems means the steps 6
involved in recognising a lemon are transformed from a set of specific associations, enculturated 
by human circumstance and experiential phenomena, into the output of an impenetrable  
probabilistic matching algorithm. Image recognition systems are of course, the result of a set of 
cultural assumptions about efficiency, accuracy, and performance, usually enacted through
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